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Abstract  
Philosophers of biology and biologists themselves for the most part assume that the concept of kin 
is progenerative: what makes two individuals kin is a direct or indirect function of reproduction.  
Derivatively, kinship might likewise be presumed to be progenerative in nature.  Yet a prominent 
view of kinship in contemporary cultural anthropology is a kind of constructivism or 
performativism that rejects such progenerativist views.  This paper critically examines an 
influential line of thinking used to critique progenerativism and support performativism that cites 
cross-cultural diversity in what I will call kinmaking.  I challenge several key assumptions made 
in moving from this appeal to ethnography to conclusions about kinship and progeneration, 
arguing that closer scrutiny of both the ethnographic record and inferences that draw on it in fact 
support progenerative views of both kinship and kinmaking.
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1.  Kinship and Kinmaking Across the Biological and Social Sciences 
Contemporary cultural anthropology represents a relatively nascent domain for philosophical 
reflection on the social sciences, as manifest in recent work on ethnoscience and the relationship 
between traditional and indigenous knowledge (Ludwig 2018; Ludwig and Poliseli 2018).  Here 
ethnobiology constitutes a central domain of knowledge that provides a rich site for culturally-
situated, philosophical reflection on the biological and social sciences (Ludwig and Weiskopf 
2019; Ludwig and El-Hani 2020).  Another philosophically rich thicket of issues in this general 
domain that shares this potential for historians and philosophers of science concerns what kinship 
is, what I will call kinmaking.1   
Philosophers of biology, along with biologists and biologically-oriented social scientists, 
for the most part assume that the concept of kin is reproductive.  For example, discussions of 
altruism, cooperation, and the mechanisms that mediate evolutionary transitions conceptualize kin 
as progeneratively related to one another: what makes two or more individuals intra- or inter-
generational kin is some kind of direct or indirect reproductive relationship between them.   
This progenerative assumption often plays an important role in structuring entire problem 
spaces in the biological sciences concerned in the first instance with nonhuman life forms.  For 
example, important to the classic problem of altruism is articulating a view of help to or self-
sacrifice for biological kin (Woodcock and Heath 2002; Voorzanger 2006).  In kin selection 






altruism towards biological kin can be viewed either as sharpening our sense of what real altruism 
amounts to, and thus what it is about the phenomenon that requires explaining, or as identifying 
one key to understanding mechanisms for evolutionary altruism (e.g., kin selection).   
Such reproductive conceptions of kin also ground progenerative views of kinship, the 
system of relationships specified by particular ways in which (mostly) human agents conceive of 
kin.  On a progenerative view of kinship, kinmaking is the cultural elaboration of reproductive 
relations, with progeneration providing a focal perspective from which to study such elaborations.  
Many contemporary cultural anthropologists, however, explicitly reject such progenerative views 
of kinship.  For many studying kinship in cultural anthropology, kinmaking’s robust cultural nature 
usurps the reproductive focus provided by progenerativism.   For example, Marshall Sahlins has 
recently defended the view “that kinship is a thoroughly symbolic-cum-cultural phenomenon”, 
arguing against “all such ‘biological’ understandings of kinship” (Sahlins 2013:65-66).  As Sandra 
Bamford says in her introduction to the Cambridge Handbook of Kinship, kinship is “human-
made” rather than “given in the ‘natural order’ of things” (Bamford 2019a:15).   
My primary aim is to explore an influential cluster of arguments against progenerativism 
about kinship that appeal to cross-cultural diversity.  I shall argue that scrutiny of the ethnographic 
evidence typically cited against progenerative views, together with a critical assessment of key 
argumentative inferences from that evidence, actually support progenerativism (sections 4-7).  In 
concluding, I shall make some comments about what such views portend for more integrated 
discussions of kinship across the biological and social sciences, such as those about primate 
kinship (sections 8-9).  I begin with the sorts of ethnographic evidence about kinmaking adduced 







2.  What the Ethnographic Record Shows 
Identifying a tradition in anthropology that holds that “kinship begins with genealogy”, Dwight 
Read (2007:330) provides a formidable-sounding, partial list of ethnographic research that 
putatively shows the paucity of this tradition for understanding kinship:  
kin relations are established through feeding and nourishment among the Wari’ in 
Amazonia (Vilaça 2002), through residence among the Korofeigu of New Guinea 
(Langness 1964), via nursing in the Arabian area (Altorki 1980), in Iran (Khatib-Chahidi 
1992), among the Hindu Kush in Pakistan (Biddulph 1880) and in the Balkans (Hammel 
1968) […] through godparenthood (e.g., Paul 1942 for Middle America, Fine 1994, 
Héritier-Augé and Copet-Rougier 1995 for Catholic Europe), through fosterage (e.g., 
Smith 1903 [1885] for Arab societies, among others), through a name giver-name receiver 
relation (e.g., Bamberger 1974 for the Kayapó, Marshall 1976 for the !Kung san, Lave et 
al. 1977 for the Krikati), and through blood kinship (e.g., Vernier 2006 and references 
therein for Turkey). 
Read says that proponents “of the genealogical position have assumed kinship distinctions relate 
to properties of a genealogical space—lineality/ colineality, ancestor/descendant, male/female, and 
so on—even though ethnographic evidence shows otherwise” (p.330).  This “genealogical space” 
generates what Rivers (1968 [1910]) originally called a pedigree.  Read’s claim is that the 
ethnographic record shows the misleading nature of this pedigree-based framework for 






Contemporary progenerativists recognize that “genealogy” is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for kinship.  I thus focus on the claim that progenerativism’s emphasis on reproductive 
relations misrepresents kinship or limits its study: to view kinship as the cultural elaboration of 
reproductive relations, as progenerativists do, is to employ a distorting paradigm.  In this sense, 
progenerativism is taken by its critics to constitute a pragmatic failure in the study of kinship, with 
this failure revealed by ethnography.2 
Arguments like Read’s against progenerativism that begin with claims about what 
ethnography reveals to draw conclusions about the nature of human kinship are enthymematic, 
requiring one or more additional premises for prima facie inferential validity: 
1.)  Progenerativism about kinship is the view that kinmaking is the cultural elaboration of 
reproductive relations. 
2.)  The ethnographic record indicates that kinmaking involves various non-reproductive 
relations. 
… [missing premises] 
 
C.)  Progenerativism misrepresents kinship and constitutes a pragmatic failure in the study 
of kinship. 
Figure 1 
The Ethnographic Argument 
Each of the following three related claims about kinmaking have been defended by anthropologists 






argument represented in Figure 1: 
3a)  Progenerative Innocence:  Since progenerative facts play a restricted epistemic role in 
kinship in some cultures due to nescience or their unimportance to the practice of kinship, 
they cannot provide even a partial basis for kinmaking in those cultures.  
3b)  Cultural Priority: The ubiquitous cultural dimension to kinmaking is conceptually prior 
to progenerative facts about kinship, not (as progenerativists presume) vice-versa.  
3c) Biological Transcendence: Kinmaking transcends reproductive relations and so 
progeneration is not at the core of kinship. 
I remain neutral regarding whether these claims need to be combined either together or with further 
premises to complete the enthymeme depicted in Figure 1.  If each is false, as I shall argue, any 
such derivative completions of The Ethnographic Argument will be unsound. 
The rejection of progenerativism has gone hand-in-hand with the development of 
contrasting constructivist views of kinship.  Historians and philosophers of science are familiar 
with general discussions of human kinds as social constructions (Mallon 2016), along with 
feminist critiques of appeals to the ‘naturalness’ of biological categories (Fausto-Sterling 2000).  
The specific form that constructivism takes for cultural anthropologists studying kinship is 
sometimes called performativism, emphasising (as the quotation from Read does) the variable 
performance of kinship across cultures.  In the next section, I say more about performativism and 
the contrast between performative and progenerative views of kinship within anthropology, 
focusing on performativism as a distinctive form of constructivism to provide at least a useful 







3.  The Embrace of Performativity in the Study of Kinship 
Performativism is anchored in Schneider’s (1972, 1984) critique of progenerativism as an 
ethnocentric, bioessentialist projection of “Western” notions of kinship onto cultures that 
conceptualize kinship otherwise (Wilson 2016a); for performativists, progenerativism is a relic of 
anthropology’s problematic past (Franklin and McKinnon 2001; Levine 2008).  The rebirth of 
kinship studies in anthropology during the 1990s—often referred to as the new kinship studies and 
playfully dubbed kinship “after Schneider” by Carsten (2004)—provided performativist pathways 
for the study of kinship (Peletz 1995, 2001).  Although the eclipse of progenerativism has not been 
as complete as proponents of performativist views have sometimes claimed, as Godelier (2011) 
and others have shown, I shall not further explore that historical or sociological issue here.  
Defences of progenerative conceptions of kinship certainly persist in the contemporary study of 
kinship in cultural anthropology (Trautmann, Feeley-Harnik, and Mitani; 2011; Shapiro 2018a).3 
 
Table 1 offers a summary of five paired features of research within the (now not so) new 
kinship studies.  Each feature that positively identifies characteristics of this work corresponds to 
a negative feature that indicates the break that performativism makes from progenerativism.  
Collectively these paired features express what is distinctive of contemporary performativist work 
on kinship, encapsulating something of the sea-change that occurred in the study of kinship 
between roughly 1970 and 1990 (see also Wilson 2016a; Bamford 2019a, 2019b).  
 
An embrace of the cultural performativity 
of kinship.  Kinmaking is performative in 
The rejection of progenerativism about 






that particular cultural symbols and 
activities give kinship its meaning and 
significance. (Carsten 2004:ch.2; Levine 
2008; Sahlins 2013:2-11)4 
elaboration of reproductive relations 
misrepresents kinship and constitutes a 
pragmatic failure in its study.  
A highlighting of the lived experiences of 
kinship.  Because the meaning of kinship is 
generated performatively, it should be 
studied as a kind of lived experience, rather 
than as result of a static structure or system. 
(Carsten 2004:9; Grøn 2020) 
A reduced interest in structuralist and 
functionalist approaches to kinship.  A 
focus on kinship systems is misplaced, and 
structuralism and functionalism do not hold 
the keys to understanding kinship. 
The exploration of kinship in novel domestic 
spaces and practices.  Focusing on kinship 
“at home” in response to technological and 
broader social changes provides a 
productive reorientation for its study. (Rapp 
and Ginsburg 2001; Bamford 2019a:1-5) 
A shift from the linguistically focused 
comparative, treatment of the culturally 
exotic.  Kinship is neither uniquely nor 
especially important in non-Western 
societies, and the past focus on culturally 
exotic kinship terminologies is misplaced. 
An emphasis on understanding particular 
meanings of relatedness and kinship.  
Whether studying relatedness in novel 
domestic places or cross-culturally, the 
particular meanings of kinship in those 
Skepticism of universal and totalizing 
claims about kinship.  The detachment of 
kinship from progeneration undermines the 
search for claims about kinship that 






contexts lies at the heart of kinship.  (Peletz 
1995:346-349; Strathern 1992) 
relationships to one another vis-à-vis 
kinship. 
A welcoming of interdisciplinary 
approaches to kinship.  The study of kinship 
is inherently interdisciplinary, informed by 
multidisciplinary fields, such as cultural 
studies, gay and lesbian studies, science 
studies, family studies, and religious 
studies. (Franklin and McKinnon 2001; 
Weston 2001:147-154) 
The displacement of kinship as distinctively 
anthropological.  Despite having been a 
mainstay of anthropological study 
throughout much of the discipline’s history, 
there is nothing special about kinship that 
justifies its anthropologically distinctive 
status or that ascribes anthropologists a 
privileged role in its study.   
 
Table 1 
Five Paired Features of the Performativist Paradigm in Kinship Studies 
 
My focus here is the initial pair of features: the cultural performativity of kinship and the rejection 
of progenerativism.  These features often occupy center-stage in big-picture, philosophical 
characterizations of the study of kinship “after Schneider” and play a prominent part in a standard 
narrative about kinship that accords a central place to Schneider’s critique (Franklin and 
McKinnon 2001; Levine 2008; Sahlins 2013).  Together they imply that progenerative relations, 
such as consanguinity and pedigree, do not play a special role in kinship and so should not direct 
or structure the study of kinship.   
With that little said, let me return to The Ethnographic Argument against progenerativism 







4.  Progeneratively Innocent Cultural Knowledge 
(3a) says that progenerative facts play a restricted epistemic role in kinship in some cultures and 
so cannot provide even a partial basis in an account of kinmaking.  In its strongest form, this is to 
claim that some cultures are progeneratively innocent, ignorant not just of the intricate details of 
biological science as developed in Western societies but of basic facts linking reproduction to 
kinship.  The most notorious case of such putative progenerative innocence in the history of 
anthropology stems from Malinowski’s (1929) report of the “ignorance of physical paternity” in 
the Trobriand Islands, a report influenced by Spencer and Gillen’s (1899) earlier reports of such 
nescience amongst Australian Aboriginal peoples.   
The claim is that both Trobrianders and Australian Aboriginal peoples have (or had) no 
knowledge of the male procreative role in producing children.  Thus, such knowledge could not 
form a partial basis for kinmaking amongst them.  This claim of Malinowski’s has been repeated 
by many anthropologists in the last fifty years (e.g., Goodenough 2001: 208; Ottenheimer 2001: 
127), including by leading advocates of performativism (e.g., Sahlins 1976:37-39; Schneider 
1984:134; Franklin 1997:22; Carsten 2000:8; Carsten 2004:164).5   Sensitivity to ethnocentrism 
by performativists about kinship and the more general rise of the “decolonizing generation” within 
cultural anthropology (Allen and Jobson 2016) make uncritical repetition of this nescience claim 
striking, especially given widespread recognition of much else that is racially charged, dated, and 
objectionable in Malinowski’s work.6    
Hiatt’s Arguments about Aborigines (1996:ch.6) provides an extended discussion of the 






of no mean order” (p.140) and concluding judiciously that the debate remains unresolved.   Hiatt’s 
judgment, however, is premised on a more demanding view of the relevant ‘facts of life’ than is 
required as part of a suitable progenerative view of kinship, a demandingness signalled by Hiatt’s 
reference to the role of the development of the microscope in generating knowledge of those facts 
(1996:140).  Yet the relevant progenerative facts are of a different order from those requiring such 
technological mediation, concerning matters whose epistemic graspability varies across the 
nonhuman Primate order but is universal within our own species (see also Wilson, unpublished).  
To deny the relevant knowledge here is to deny any conception of biological paternity at all.  For 
this reason, it is very difficult to fully detach the nescience falsely ascribed to Aboriginal 
Australians from its origins in discredited primitivist views of such peoples advocated by Spencer 
and Frazer (Hiatt 1996:120-124). 
 Shapiro (2014, 2017, 2018a) has, in any case, more recently provided an extended critique 
of this claim about the ignorance of physical paternity and its history; his discussion draws directly 
on Malinowski’s popular publications and his original research report, together with the more 
recent scholarship on the Trobriands (Senft 1998, 2009; Mosko 2009; Lepani 2012).7  Shapiro 
concurs with Leach’s (1958) conclusion about what became known as the virgin birth controversy: 
that Malinowski had mistaken a public denial by male elders of a male sexual role in reproduction 
that forms part of religious belief in reincarnation amongst the Trobrianders for a lack of 
knowledge or ignorance of paternity.   
So the uncritical repetition and retention of this claim in contemporary studies of kinship 
is a mistake.  Far from reflecting the ethnographic record, it shows a disregard for that record, 
properly viewed.  Trobrianders simply do not have, and likely never had, the form of progenerative 






comparative discussion that ranges across the Mae Enga in the New Guinea highlands, the 
Trobrianders, and Australian Aboriginal cultures, “In none of these instances is there anything 
even barely resembling a lack of knowledge of paternity.  The whole subject, really, is nothing 
more than a product of Victorian fantasy” (Shapiro 2014:33). 
In keeping with identifying a pragmatic failure facing progenerativism, one might 
nonetheless seek to defend the kind of scepticism expressed by Progenerative Innocence and 
manifest in the ignorance of paternity claim by turning to kinmaking practices that involve 
alloparenting, such as nurturance, nursing, and adoption (Modell 1994; Carsten 2004:138-140).  
Since parenting roles can be filled by non-(biological) kin, knowledge of reproductive relations 
may seem peripheral to the performance of kinship.  If so, then progenerativism may still suffer a 
pragmatic failure in light of its emphasis on the importance of reproductive relations to kinship.   
Practices of alloparenting are, however, far from progeneratively innocent.  First, consider 
nurturance and nursing, both of which can be undertaken by non-(biological) kin and either of 
which can be kinmaking.  Yet they do so predominantly (if not always) against cultural 
backgrounds in which biological parents, and particularly mothers, typically engage in these forms 
of provisioning.  When practices emerge in which other individuals come to play those roles 
dominantly across a culture, they are primarily filled by individuals who are themselves first-
degree biological relatives of the parents of the dependent child provided for and are recognized 
as such.   The fact that, in some or even many circumstances, either nurturance or nursing can 
create kinship in the absence of genealogical or reproductive relationships in particular cases no 
more supports the ascription of progenerative innocence than does the fact that there are contexts 
in which Trobrianders and Australian Indigenous people (particularly men) who deny certain 






Likewise, adoption is a widespread, recognized cultural practice that brings a pair of people 
into a parent-child relationship that might appear to be progeneratively innocent.  For example, in 
Hawaii, the high rate of adoption has led some (e.g., Sahlins 1976:48-49; McKinnon 2005:112-
113) to suggest that progeneration is unimportant to family life there.  Yet adoption practices are 
always deployed against a cultural background in which parent-child relationships are also 
recognized as being progenerative in nature (Berman 2014; Shapiro 2016:221-228).  Rather than 
the ethnographic record evidencing the “unimportance of genealogy in Hawaiian life … adopters 
are usually close procreative kin of the natal family” (Shapiro 2015:8-9) and are known to be such 
kin.  This is also the case amongst the Yup’ik Inuit people of northwest Alaska and Marshall 
Islanders amongst whom adoption and other practices of child circulation operate against the 
background of both biological and social interactional constraints on kinship (Berman 2014).  The 
performance of kinship by Hawaiians, by the Yup’ik Inuit, and by Marshall Islanders that appears 
in the ethnographic record is progeneratively grounded, rather than progeneratively innocent.  
Alloparenting’s distinctive forms of kinmaking rely in practice on the cultural recognition of 
progenerative parentage.   
 
5.  The Conceptual Priority of Culture 
Consider now (3b), the claim that the ubiquitous cultural dimension to kinship is conceptually 
prior to progenerative facts about kinship and so the latter are actually dependent on the former, 
contrary to progenerativism.  Marshall Sahlins (2013) has eloquently articulated this claim as part 
of his sustained defence of a performativist view of kinship.  Sahlins’s basic idea here is that 
kinmaking can’t be the cultural elaboration of reproduction because the relevant, constituent 






Converting this thought into the kind of premise needed to complete The Ethnographic Argument 
depicted in Figure 1, however, is problematic.   
To show this, I shall focus on several key inferential moves in Sahlins’s discussion, 
italicized in the passages below.  Talking of birth and brotherhood, Sahlins says 
brothers by compact may be ‘closer’ and more solidary than brothers by birth.  But then, 
kinship is not given by birth as such, since human birth is not a pre-discursive fact.  A 
whole series of persons may be bodily instantiated in the newborn child, including lineage 
and clan ancestors, while even the woman who gave birth is excluded (Sahlins 2013:3, 
emphasis added) 
Sahlins returns to develop these claims about the relationship between constructed or performative 
forms of kinship and reproductive relations, saying that if 
children are conceived, say, from the ‘blood’ of the mother and the ‘sperm’ of the father, 
these are not mere physiological substances of reproduction but meaningful social 
endowments of ancestral and affinal identities and potencies.  For they link the child to 
others with whom the parents are known to share such substances.  It follows that what is 
reproduced in the birth is a system of kinship relations and categories in which the child 
is given a specific position and positional value.  It likewise follows that kinship is a 
thoroughly symbolic-cum-cultural phenomenon … (Sahlins 2013: 65-66, emphases added; 
see also 74-75).  
The inferential moves italicized above fail because they either equivocate or are circular: they 
either shift, mid-argument, the meaning of critical terms, such as “birth” or “sperm”, or they 






 Consider first the claim that kinship is not given by birth as such, since human birth is not 
a pre-discursive fact.  The only sense in which the latter part of this claim is true is if human birth 
means something like “the significance or meaning of human birth”, i.e., birth as culturally 
constructed.  But that same sense makes the first part of the claim, kinship is not given by birth as 
such, false; indeed, Sahlins himself devotes much attention to showing how the various meanings 
that birth has constitute an important part of kinship across cultures.  If we interpret birth 
consistently across this argument in this way, Sahlins would be saying that because the meaning 
of human birth is not a pre-discursive fact (true), kinship is not given by the meaning of birth 
(false).  Apart from this conditional itself being false, it also says nothing at all about 
progenerativism and draws a conclusion that a performativist would reject, rather than accept.  
Might we instead take the expression birth as such as signaling a progenerative referent for 
the term birth in Sahlins’s conclusion that kinship is not given by birth?  If so, then either human 
birth in his premise has this same referent or it doesn’t.  If it does, then the premise—human birth 
is not a pre-discursive fact—is false.  If it doesn’t, then the argument equivocates on the term birth.  
In effect, this makes the argument question-begging, since (3b) is meant to provide an independent 
reason for viewing progenerativism as a pragmatic failure, based on the ethnographic facts.  All 
that Sahlins would have asserted is that because culturally constructed birth is not a pre-discursive 
fact—something that progenerativists and performativists alike agree on—kinship is not given 
progeneratively—precisely what is in dispute.  At best, this is an argumentative stalemate. 
 Similar problems face the claims in the second passage from Sahlins.  The claim that 
‘blood’ and ‘sperm’ are not mere physiological substances of reproduction but meaningful social 
endowments of ancestral and affinal identities and potencies is true only of the symbolic meaning 






this out about the relevant symbolic meanings, such claims cannot be used as premises in an 
argument for birth itself reproducing a system of kinship relations and categories (first conclusion) 
or that kinship is a thoroughly symbolic-cum-cultural phenomenon (second conclusion), since the 
latter conclusion is already presupposed in these claims. 
Pervading Sahlins’s broader discussion is a shift between relationally characterized events 
(such as birth), processes (such as reproduction), and people (such as mothers), and our 
representations of such events, processes and people.  In his general conclusion to What Kinship 
Is—And Is Not, after providing a reprise of “cultural discourses of procreation” (2013:86), Sahlins 
poses a rhetorical question that he then answers: “Should all this cultural variability be laid to a 
physiological constant?  Clearly human birth is a semiotic function of a kinship order, rather than 
kinship a biological sequitur of birth” (2013:87).  Here human birth must mean something like our 
representation or idea of human birth in the first part of Sahlins’s answer, while birth can’t mean 
this in the second part of that answer.11   
To track this critique via an explicit representation of the completion of the enthymematic 
Ethnographic Argument with which we began, consider (3) – (6) as missing premisses provided 
by Sahlins’ critique:  
1. Progenerativism about kinship is the view that kinmaking is the cultural elaboration of 
reproductive relations. 
2.  The ethnographic record indicates that kinmaking involves various non-reproductive 
relations.  But 
3. Kinship is not given by birth because birth is not a pre-discursive fact. 
4.  Blood and sperm are not mere physiological substances of reproduction but 






5.  What is reproduced in birth is a system of kinship relations, and  
6. Kinship is a thoroughly symbolic-cum-cultural phenomenon. So, 
C. Progenerativism misrepresents kinship and constitutes a pragmatic failure in the study 
of kinship. 
 My argument in this section has been that (3), (4), and (5) all involve equivocations or circularity, 
in effect assuming (6).  Thus, they do not provide a sound completion of The Ethnographic 
Argument. 
 
6.  The Transcendence of Biological Relations and Progeneration 
 
Consider now (3c), Biological Transcendence, the view that kinmaking transcends reproductive 
relations and so progeneration is not at the core of kinship.  Just as Read has provided a clear 
overview of the ethnographic diversity to the practice of kinship, in wider ranging work he 
likewise succinctly expresses the basis for a progeneratively-transcendent view of kinship: 
Kinship in human societies … provides conceptual ways for individuals to identify the kin 
relationship they have to one another.  We can usefully distinguish between kinship in this 
conceptual sense and biological kinship arising from reproduction by referring to the 
former as cultural kinship.  Although cultural kinship is still ultimately based on the 
biological facts of reproduction, it transcends its biological roots through forming 
conceptually expressed systems of kinship relations that need not parallel biological 
kinship relations (Read 2012:14). 
The distinction between biological and cultural kinship, sometimes glossed as that between 






is ubiquitous in the literature.  As section 1 implies, however, rather than a dichotomy there is 
actually a trichotomy in play here, with cultural kinship transcending both biologically-defined 
concepts of kin, such as that used in the theory of kin selection, and biologically-conceived or 
progenerative kinship, the object of the performativist critique of the study of kinship.   
Although performativists tend to be more sceptical of the claim that cultural kinship is 
“based on the biological facts of reproduction” than is Read,12 the idea of cultural kinship 
transcending biological kinship in ways incompatible with progenerativism features in the most 
widely accepted inferential pathway linking ethnographic diversity to the rejection of 
progenerativism.  As Sahlins says about kinmaking, “the current orthodoxy in kinship studies can 
be summed up in the proposition that any relationship constituted in terms of procreation, filiation, 
or descent can also be made postnatally or performatively by culturally appropriate action.  
Whatever is construed genealogically may also be constructed socially” (2013:2).  For 
performativists, culturally constructed kinship supercedes or replaces, rather than expands upon, 
progenerative kinship. 
Evidence about the internal structure to kinship terminologies, however, shows why (3c) 
draws the wrong conclusion about kinmaking and progeneration. I begin here with a reminder 
about a point that Ernest Gellner first made over sixty years ago in a short series of exchanges with 
Rodney Needham (Gellner 1957, 1960; Needham 1960).  Gellner’s general point was that there 
was an inconsistency in Needham’s claim that “[b]iology is one thing, descent is quite another, of 
a different order” (Needham 1960:97), since the very phenomena that Needham appealed to in 
support of this claim—adoption, leviratic marriage, ghost marriage—logically presupposed the 






man marries a deceased brother’s widow and raises descendants in his brother’s name” (Gellner 
1960, 188).  Here brother and descendant are both in fact understood in progenerative terms within 
cultures practicing leviratic marriage.  As Gellner says, the “anthropologist’s kinship term 
‘leviratic’ is only applicable when certain real kinship relations obtain” (Gellner 1960:188; see 
also Gellner 1957).  The performance of leviratic kinship, much like the alloparental practices of 
adoption discussed in section 4, is anchored in progenerative activity. 
This strengthens the more general point about the performativity of kinship that involves 
alloparenting made there.  In key cases that performativists themselves cite of cultural elaborations 
of kinship drawn from the ethnographic record, moving beyond a superficial understanding of 
what that record shows about the performance of kinship reveals ways in which progenerative 
dimensions to kinship remain important.  The cultural elaborations central to kinmaking are built 
around and on progenerative relations.  
The logical presupposition identified by Gellner with respect to leviratic kinship parallels 
a claim that Shapiro has made in a brief response to Sahlins that keeps ethnography in focus.  
Shapiro notes that “the ethnographic record reveals a wide variety of acts other than procreation 
by which ties of kinship are established. … But we are entitled to ask a question not raised by 
Sahlins and only rarely approached by other new kinship scholars: are these non-procreative acts 
modeled on native appreciations of procreation?” (Shapiro 2012:191; see also Shapiro 2014:19).  
Central to Shapiro’s development of his positive answer to this question is the phenomenon of 
focality and its relationship to extensionism about kinship terminologies (Shapiro 2018a; Shapiro 






 Extensionism traces back deep into the history of the study of kinship, based on a 
motivating idea found in Morgan’s original (and problematic) introduction of the distinction 
between descriptive and classificatory kinship systems (1868, 1871).  The motivating general idea, 
inconsonant with (3c), is that not all referents of kinship terms are created equally, for some—
those that are progenerative—are more fundamental than others.  Extensionism itself makes a more 
specific claim about the meaning of kinship terms.  It is often associated with Malinowski’s 
developmentally-expressed view that the “individual meanings [of kin terms] … start with a main 
or primary reference; which then through successive extensions engenders a series of derived 
meanings” (Malinowski 1929:138).13  Extensionism received its most elaborate and precise 
articulation in the work of Harold Scheffler and Floyd Lounsbury in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Lounsbury 1965; Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971; Scheffler 1972) and has been most recently re-
explored by a range of essays in a Festschrift volume focused on Scheffler’s work (Shapiro 2018b).   
The core claims made by extensionism are expressible as follows.  In every language, there 
is a core set of kinship terms and these are progenerative in nature.  Kinship terms such as ‘mother’, 
‘father’, ‘brother’, and ‘sister’, have a primary meaning or focus, where “focal membership is 
supplied mostly by nuclear family relationships, from which relationships it is extended to 
people—even to things—outside the nuclear family” (Shapiro and Read 2018:3).  This core set of 
terms is primary, or have primary reference or meaning, in at least three senses.   
First, despite all the cultural variation to kinship, their equivalents are found in every 
culture (cf. Wierzbicka 2016).  Second, other kinship terms—what Lounsbury (1965:149) calls 
genealogical extensions—can be defined, characterized, or glossed in terms of them.  Third, 
broader and more metaphorical uses of kinship terminology—what (Lounsbury 1965:149) calls 






Given the relations of extension between the primary kinship terms and both other kinship terms 
and other uses of both primary and these other kinship terms, the primary kinship terms are focal 
terms and serve as a model for the idiom of kinship more generally.   
Extensionism, particularly in the form articulated in terms of Chomskyan-like rewrite rules 
by Lounsbury and Scheffler, has been rejected by many anthropologists as being itself an 
ethnocentric projection of Western views of kinship.  Shapiro (2014, 2015, 2016) has made a 
convincing case, however, that the identification of the phenomenon of focality invoked by 
extensionists is itself part of the “native’s point of view”.  Far from being some kind of “etic” 
imposition from “the West”, some kind of progenerative understanding is part of how kinship itself 
is conceptualized across a variety of distinct ethnographic contexts.   
The recent Australian-based ethnographic work of Victoria Burbank and Patrick 
McConvell that attends to extensionism more explicitly further supports Shapiro’s view.  Burbank 
concurs that extensionism captures the lived experience of kinship and that Scheffler’s extensionist 
“interpretation of Aboriginal kin classification, his ideas about polysemy, the focality of some kin, 
like fathers and mothers, and the extension of labels for them to less focal others makes perfect 
sense, at least in Aboriginal Australia” (Burbank 2018:205).  McConvell argues for “the strong 
hypothesis that all diachronic changes in kin-term meanings in Australia can be explained as 
addition of, or loss of, reduction rules as formulated by Scheffler, or minor variations or sequential 
combinations of them” (McConvell 2018:238), identifying Kronenfeld’s work on contextual 
variation in extension patterns as a contributing resource beyond Scheffler’s own work here (see 







7.  Does Extensionism Really Support a Progenerative View of Kinship? 
In the previous section, I argued that if extensionism captures the structure to usages of kinship 
terminology, then progeneration infuses kinship in a way that undermines Biological 
Transcendence.  Read (2018) has, in effect, recently challenged this claim by distinguishing two 
parts to extensionism: that there is a core set of kinship terms and that these are progenerative in 
nature.  Read argues that the phenomena of focality and modelling support only the first of these 
claims.  For Read, extensionism captures the structure to kinship terminologies but the 
computational logic governing that structure generates kinship knowledge independently of any 
commitment to progenerativism.  As Read puts it: 
If two persons know their respective kin-term relationship to a third person, then they may 
compute the kinship relation they have to each other through their cultural knowledge 
regarding how the kin terms making up their kinship terminology are interrelated.  They do 
the computations without reference to the genealogical relations subsumed under the kin 
terms (Read 2018:75, my emphasis). 
While the knowledge generated by systems of kin terminologies plays important roles in the 
performance of kinship, as Read has emphasised, Read’s final claim here is mistaken. 
Read draws on his long-term development of a formal theory of kinship terminology (e.g., 
Read 1984, 2001, 2007; Leaf and Read 2020:ch.11), one organised around the idea that kinship 
terminologies built from a small set of primary kin terms that specify family relations generate 
“computational systems enabling culture bearers to determine kinship relations” (Read 2018, 72).  






terms, define a structure that plays a central role in capturing and expressing substantial cultural 
knowledge of kinship.  That formal theory contributes much to our understanding of how kinship 
terminologies are structured and used within any given culture, as well as to how those structures 
and uses vary across cultures.   
To see why Read is mistaken in the further inferences that he draws about progenerativism, 
however, consider the following pair of schemata: 
Schema 1: X is the father of Y; Y is the sister of Z; therefore, X is the father of Z. 
The inference expressed in this schema generates the kind of knowledge that speakers have access 
to simply in virtue of knowing the relevant kin terms.  We can know that X is the father of Z simply 
by knowing that X is the father of Y and Y is the sister of Z.  Consider now Schema 2: 
Schema 2: A is the stepfather of B; B is the adopted sister of C; therefore, A is the 
(step)father of C. 
The inference in Schema 2 is neither valid nor one that speakers reliably make, whether the 
conclusion contains father or stepfather.  A stepfather is a cultural construction of father, and an 
adopted sister is a cultural construction of sister, each referring to kin relations that lack a 
progenerative dimension.  The inferential breakdown in moving from Schema 1 to Schema 2 
suggests that the computational logic of the system of kinship terms in English is progenerative, 
for that is precisely what is present in Schema 1 but absent in Schema 2.  By using kinship terms 
that are explicitly non-progenerative in Schema 2, we can see more clearly the progenerative 
presupposition of Schema 1.  Thus, the impression that Schema 1 can be employed or activated by 






 The same is true of the computational systems featuring kin-term products that Read 
identifies as important sources of cultural knowledge about kinship.  Consider Figure 2 below, 
which Read uses (2018:76) in illustrating the fact that “cousin” is a kin-term product of “aunt” and 
“daughter”: 
 
Figure 2: Read on Kin-term products 
Figure 2 expresses both the truth that the daughter of one’s aunt is one’s cousin and—what Read 
emphasises—that knowing that your aunt refers to someone as her daughter allows you to infer 
that that person is your cousin.  But both the truth and the corresponding knowledge hold only if 
aunt and daughter are defined progeneratively: the respective inferences fail once one drops this 
constraint and allows the inference to relate anyone called an aunt or a daughter in an appropriate 
cultural context.   






Jean also provided sponsorship for a child in Africa whom she referred to as her daughter.  That 
child neither was my cousin nor did anyone in my family (or in Aunt Jean’s) think that she was.  
Perhaps such a case would be precluded by Read because neither the reference kin terms aunt and 
daughter nor the derivative kin-term product cousin are being “properly used” by the Speaker and 
Alter 1.  But this surely just pushes the problem back one further step, since then it seems clear 
that “proper uses” of these terms are progenerative.   
In short, while we can distinguish cultural from biological kinship, the former expands on 
the latter and so inherits its progenerative nature.  We can likewise, following Read, distinguish 
between two parts to extensionism, a structural part governed by a computational logic and the 
substantive assumption of progenerativism.  Yet the logic requires the substantive assumption.  
Proponents of extensionism rightly take their view of kinship terminologies to support 
progenerativism about kinship.  That being so, Biological Transcendence is false. 
 
8.  Progenerative Kinship and Nonhuman Primates 
 
Progenerative conceptions of kinmaking, shared across the biological and social sciences, have the 
potential to more closely align work on kin and kinship across those sciences.  Recent work on 
kinship in nonhuman primates within evolutionary anthropology illustrates what shape that 
alignment might take (Evans, Levinson, and Sterelny 2021).   
Despite nonhuman primates lacking the linguistic and cultural systems necessary for 
kinship systems, “kinship has deep phylogenetic roots as an organizing force within nonhuman 






(Silk 2020:127; see also Silk 2001).  Since all primates recognise at least some kin, this shaping is 
cognitively-mediated within primate populations.  It is not simply that primatologists impose a 
biologically-defined concept of kin to understand those patterns.  Nonhuman primates themselves 
recognize biological kin. 
How far such recognitional capacities take us down the path to kinship remains 
controversial.  As Ronald Planer has recently put it, echoing Dennett, perhaps nonhuman primates 
merely deploy a “competence without comprehension” (Planer 2020:4) that requires no concept 
of kin, rather than recognising kin as kin, which does require some such concept.  If nonhuman 
primates do possess this latter conceptual capacity for kin recognition, do they also possess a 
maternally-focused form of primeval kinship, as Bernard Chapais has argued in a series of 
publications over the past fifteen years (Chapais 2008, 2014, 2016)?  On Chapais’s view, the 
expansion of uterine kinship to siblings and eventually (and only partially amongst nonhuman 
primates) to fathers and their offspring led to human kinship systems: fundamental kinship 
structures exist as part of our primate heritage and are not unique to the Homo lineage.  
Distinctively human kinship clearly draws on cognitive capacities for kin recognition and 
the recognition of kin relationships, capacities that are at least partially shared with our closest 
primate relatives.  Without presuming just how far nonhuman primates have travelled down the 
cognitive path from competence without comprehension to primeval kinship, the question to ask 
is what form of kinship likely emerges once the shift from mere competence with recognition of 
kin and kin relationships to comprehension of kin as kin was made.   






likely progenerative, since the perceptual and conceptual tracking capacities at the heart of his 
view of primeval kinship are directed at progenerative facts.  If kinship emerged only within the 
Homo lineage (say, because it requires language), by contrast, the same general question arises.  
Notwithstanding the importance of the human capacity to articulate and elaborate on kinship 
relationships through language and in culturally specific ways, linguistically-mediated kinship 
itself still evolved against a backdrop of cognitive capacities allowing our ancestors to recognise 
biological kin.  If the original form of human kinship was non-progenerative, we still require an 
account of how it arose, given these antecedent cognitive capacities. Even if early human kinship 
was not progenerative, primeval nonhuman primate kinmaking almost certainly was. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
I have argued that, contrary to recently popular views within cultural anthropology, 
performativism about kinship is not in fact supported by an appeal to ethnography.  Kinmaking 
neither (a) is progeneratively innocent, nor (b) gives conceptual priority to culture, nor (c) is a 
biologically transcendent phenomenon, with progenerative facts being either ignored or left behind 
with the development of the concept of kinship.  Despite performativists’ correspondingly critical 
view of progenerativism, a progenerative conception of kinship, one shared across the biological 
and social sciences, has the potential to unify (or at least more closely align) work on kin and 
kinship across those sciences, such as that on primate kinship.  
As the framing of the paper perhaps suggests, the work to be done in realizing this 






work within the philosophy of anthropology on ethnoscience and its study acknowledged at the 
outset of the paper, philosophical and historiographical scrutiny are entwined.  In the case of the 
study of kinship, reconsidering the place of progeneration in the concept of kinship against a 
contemporary disciplinary backdrop that often considers the study of kinship to have moved 
beyond such “bioessentialism” invites a corresponding revisiting of the received narrative about 
kinship in anthropology’s past (Wilson 2016a; Shapiro 2020).  The rejection of Progenerative 
Innocence, Cultural Priority, and Biological Transcendence comes with a requisite 
historiographical re-evaluation of taken-for-granted disciplinary narratives.   
That re-evaluation will involve addressing larger issues in the discipline, such as the roles 
of biology and psychology in the explanation of cultural phenomena, the resistance to reductive 
tendencies that has motivated support for cultural relativism within anthropology, and the nature 
of the relationships between kinship and gender.  Here the analytic and conceptual tools deployed 
by philosophers of science can provide the basis for some ground-shifting.  Philosophers of science 
prepared to direct their energy to such issues to the philosophy of anthropology have much to 










†  I dedicate this paper to the late Marshall Sahlins, whose visiting lectures on history and 
anthropology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign more than 20 years ago manifested 
the richness of the trading zone between philosophy and anthropology.  Many thanks also to David 
Ludwig, Ron Planer, John Sutton, and several anonymous reviewers for constructive feedback on 
earlier versions, and Nick Evans, Warren Shapiro, and Marilyn Strathern for general 
encouragement in pursing the larger project to which this paper contributes.  This research is 
funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC-DP 210102954, Keeping Kinship in Mind). 
1   Kinmaking is a pithy truncation (thanks, Nick Evans) of “kinship making”, which I have used 
in recent years.  The expression “making kin” derives from the work of Donna Haraway (2016) 
on inter- and multi-species relations; the recent truncation fortuitously invites discussion of 
potential Strathernian cross-overs here.  
2   I thank an anonymous referee for comments that have helped to clarify this characterization of 
the nature of the purported failure of progenerativism. 
3  Any sustained discussion of the rise of performativism would need to grapple with two larger 
issues: (a) the role of Schneider’s critique of kinship itself, where some take Schneider to have 
definitively shown the bankruptcy of progenerativism (Levine 2008; Bamford 2019a; Leaf and 
Read 2020:15), while others view Schneider’s own history of kinship studies as flawed (Godelier 
2011:ch.1; Kuper 1999:ch.4; Shapiro 2020); (b) the relationship between performativism and shifts 
in views of gender within anthropology (Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Strathern 1992; Hamberger 







4   For those interested in further exploration, I include references here to recent work advocating 
each of these positive views of kinship; thanks to David Ludwig for suggesting this addition to 
Table 1. 
5   In the first half of his A Critique of the Study of Kinship, Schneider provided a progeneratively-
innocent reinterpretation of his own earlier ethnography of Yapese culture, claiming that key 
notions in the Yapese kinship system were not progenerative.  A full discussion of this attempt 
requires separate treatment; for critiques, see Helmig (1997), Kuper (1999:ch.4), and Shapiro 
(2020). 
6   I appeal to Malinowski’s classic work to criticize both his claims about ignorance of physical 
paternity and their uncritical repetition by anthropologists in support of Progenerative Innocence.  
As the surrounding text suggests, I am indebted here to the work of Warren Shapiro. 
7   Although Shapiro does not appear to have responded directly to Hiatt’s assessment, some may 
find of interest the contrasting treatments of Tomkinson’s reports from the Western Desert by 
Shapiro (2014:30-32) and Hiatt (1996:136-139).   
8  Senft (1998:135, note 6) characterizes the ignorance of physical paternity ascribed to 
Trobrianders as “one of the few mistakes of Malinowksi’s”.  Senft tellingly notes only in passing 
the widespread conveyance of the mistake within anthropology and its popularizations, and how 
readily it can be shown to be a mistake.  Larger issues of historiography arise for any broader 
discussion of Malinowski’s work and its implications for race and ethnicity; for a recent example 
focused on Malinowski’s published diaries, see Weston and Djohari (2020:ch.3). 
9   This sort of dependency claim parallels one familiar in feminist critiques of biological work on 
sex and gender (Hankinson Nelson 2021), reminding us of the potential fruitfulness of treating 







10  Reactions that I have had to what follows include (i) incredulity that Sahlins could be 
committing “first-year mistakes in reasoning” and (ii) the claim that the argument works by 
pointing to the constructed or performative nature of notions like birth as grounds for rejecting 
progenerativism.  My response is that (i*) equivocation and circularity are easier fallacies to 
commit than one might think, and (ii*) this suggested alternative interpretation of how the 
argument works fails because it is circular.  Consider the claim that kinship is performative and so 
not progenerative because reproduction itself is socially constructed as a missing premise in an 
argument from ethnographic record to the rejection of progenerativism.  This premise explicitly 
contains precisely what one is attempting to show: the two italicized phrases above effectively say 
the same thing, and so one cannot be a premise in an argument for the other. 
11   This kind of unmarked transition between talk of relations and talk of our ideas of relations is 
familiar to historians of modern philosophy, especially scholars of Locke (Bennett 1996).  It has 
been argued that in other work on histography and anthropology that explicitly discusses Locke 
on relations, Sahlins makes precisely this transition (Wilson 2016b; see also Strathern 2016).   
12  Schneider’s critique of kinship included an explicit attack on the idea that kinship has a “base 
in nature” or is “rooted in” or “based on” biological facts (Schneider 1984:138; see also Franklin 
and McKinnon 2001:2-6, and Wilson 2016a). 
13  In contrast with my rejection of Malinowski’s claims about ignorance of paternity, here I take 
Malinowski to have had an insight into the semantics of kinship terms that stands the test of time.  
One irony is that Malinowski is generally valued for his ethnographic methodology rather than his 
theoretical depth.  Yet the former shows itself as compromised in the ignorance of paternity claim, 







14   Cronk et al. (2019) have recently pointed out that the focality central to extensionism only 
partly solves the misalignment between genetic relatedness and kin terms and argue that the 
adjustment needed is to introduce the generalised notion of fitness interdependence in models of 
trait spread and stability.  Their view of kin terminologies as culturally constructed but biologically 
constrained comports with the view I defend here.   
15  Read defines kin term product as follows: “Suppose that K and L are kin terms, then the kin 
term product of the kin terms K and L, is a kin term M that speaker would (properly) use (if any) 
for alter 2 when alter 1 (properly) refers to alter 2 by the kin term K and speaker (properly) refers 
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